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Abstract 
The internalization of law is said to be a process that involves a change in people’s intrinsic 
motivation to act in accord with law’s obligations – so that it is possible to observe imposed 
obligations become individual choices. We empirically test for this phenomenon, by 
attempting to disentangle the impacts of a legal change (a 5 pence charge on use of plastic 
bags) on intrinsic motivation and individual choice. We do so by measuring both behaviors 
and attitudes before and after the legal change, and by comparing the impacts across 
neighboring jurisdictions without the change. Using a differences-in-differences (DID) 
estimator we find evidence for the internalization of law: that is, we find a significant 
increase in intrinsic motivation for those consumers subject to the implementation of the 
legislative change, and link this change in intrinsic motivation to an actual change in 
behavior. However, using mediation analysis we find that internalization of the law only 
explains around 5 to 8% of the change in behavior – the rest being attributable to the direct 
effect of the charge.     
Keywords:  internalization of law; behavioral; mediation analysis. 
JEL codes: Q5; D1; K1; C4.  
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1. Introduction 
How much of real-world behavior is driven by internalized principles of law, and how much of 
it is motivated by the economic incentives implicit in law’s sanctions? For example, do drivers stay 
stationary at red lights in the middle of the night because it is an internalized obligation to do so, or 
because of the fear of the sanction that might result if they do not? That is, is this a principle being 
observed, a price being avoided, or some combination of the two? There is likely to be some of each 
occurring at every red light in every society; we wish to know if it is possible to separate out between 
these functions of law. 
A survey of experimental literature related to this issue provides two real-world examples that 
illustrate the potentially divergent impacts of sanctions as economic incentives.   Bowles and Polania-
Reyes (2012) cite the classic example of the Haifa school that introduced a fine against late pick-ups, 
inducing a rash of lateness. And they contrast this with the example of the Irish plastic bag charge, in 
which the introduction of a 15 cent charge on each bag resulted in an almost immediate and absolute 
reduction of 94% in the regulated activity (Convery et. al. 2007). They argue that these examples, and 
many experimental results, demonstrate that incentives do not always operate in the manner of a 
system of prices applied to non-conforming behavior. A change in law (or other policy) can induce 
responses that are more in line with a theory of internalized compliance than the theory of deterrence 
via monitoring and sanction.2  It is possible that both are present to some extent in regard to any given 
change in law. 
                                                            
2 There is a substantial literature demonstrating that this more complex response may sometimes be observed by 
consequence of its occasional negation. The classic example is the changed policy in Haifa of school-imposed 
late fees imposed on parents for the late collection of children (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2010).  In this example 
the parents responded to the late fee by increasing the rate at which they were tardy, using the sanction as the 
price of additional childcare rather than as a sanction or guide to anti-social behaviour.  Similarly, new policy-
making by the Boston Fire Department backfired when they introduced a fixed schedule of “sick leave days”, 
and fines for excessive leave.  The response to the fines was an increase of more than 100% in the number of 
days claimed, especially around holiday times (Belkin, 2002; Greenberger 2003). Fines for staying-on in 
hospital beds in Norway had the same effect (Holmas et. al. 2010). This tradition of potentially perverse 
responses to economic incentives harkens back to the example of payment for blood donations first cited by 
Titmuss (1971), and demonstrates that norms and principles (without express sanctions) can indeed have an 
own-effect, which can be negated by the introduction of penalties.    
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This paper aims to undertake an empirical assessment of the direct (price-based) effect and the 
more indirect (internalized motivational) effect. We wish to both estimate the impact of the legal 
change, and to separate out between its direct and indirect impacts. 
In order to perform these various estimations, we study the impact of the recent adoption of a 
law in England that mandated a charge for the use of new plastic bags. To ascertain the impact of the 
law, we use the existence of differences in law in neighboring jurisdictions to perform differences-in-
differences estimation.  In order to separate out between the impact of the new charge in terms of 
direct and indirect (i.e. internalized) impacts, we undertake a staged survey of UK residents 
commencing immediately before, and continuing for several months after, the implementation of the 
new law.3 In this way we assess the relationship between stated differences in changed behavior and 
changed motivation, and compare this to the overall response.  We then undertake a mediation 
analysis, attributing that part of the changed behavior that does not appear to be related to self-
reported changes in internalized motivation to the impact of the economic incentive. Our findings are 
that consumers responded to the change in English law, with changes in behavior that appear to derive 
in part from the reported changes in internalized motivation.  This reported change in personal 
motivation accounts for about 5 to 8 percent of the change in behavior in our study.  In this sense, this 
change in law has had some measurable “own-effect”:  there exists a discernible and significant effect 
of law purely associated to the reported change in intrinsic motivations. 
We proceed as follows.  In section 2 we briefly review the literature on the impacts of legal 
intervention via changed internal motivation.  In section 3 we set out our strategy for analyzing this 
policy experiment and describe the policy intervention and the survey conducted around it.  In section 
4 we set out the basic results from the survey and our analysis of what it implies for the existence of 
the internalization of law.  In section 5 we provide a brief discussion of our results, and how they 
provide evidence for the internalization of law.  In section 6 we conclude. 
                                                            
3 The English law included a price-based sanction of 5 pence for the continuing use of new plastic bags, and so 
it is necessary to acquire additional information from consumers to assess the extent to which they responded to 
the principle or the price.  
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2. Literature: The Internalization of Law 
The classic literature on the nature of the response to legal change has long suggested that the 
introduction of a new principle or policy can generate responses consisting of both direct and indirect 
effects.4   Legal scholars such as Cooter (1998), McAdams (1997), and Sunstein (1996) have 
highlighted the expressive function of law.  In this conception the law-maker expresses a statement 
about appropriate behavior that can then lead to a change in prevailing preferences, beliefs, and 
norms.5  As noted by Scott (2000), such statements can influence individual behavior via various 
channels, including the internalization of the legal rule by individual citizens (generating self-
enforcement of stated principles).  In this respect, Etzioni (2000, 167) observes that internalization 
may be viewed as “a remarkable process through which imposed obligations (compliance with which 
must be forced or paid for) become desires.”  
There are also other approaches to understanding internalization.  Kaplow and Shavell (2007) 
propose a specific model of internalized behavioral change in response to the statement of a new legal 
principle. In their model, they hypothesize the existence of an in-built system of individual 
preferences for acting in conformity with the law. The authors assume that both the characteristic of 
guilt (giving rise to a negative impact on individual utility by reason of actions in conflict with law) 
and of virtue (giving rise to a positive impact on individual utility from actions in conformity with 
law) may exist within an individual’s objective function, motivating individual behavior in the 
direction of newly stated legal principles. Further, these components of utility may be given greater 
effect by means of the law-maker’s expenditures on “inculcation”.  In this view, individual objectives 
become an amalgam of both the direct utility received from specific acts in given situations (deriving 
from the benefits and costs flowing from those choices in that legal environment), and the indirect 
utility received simply from acting in conformity with stated legal principles.  
                                                            
4 Hart (1997, 242) famously suggested the mechanism of the internal point of view, which is manifested by 
‘accepting the law as providing guides to their conduct and standards or criticism’.  Once this viewpoint is 
adopted, one moves from ‘observer’ to a ‘member’, and the member uses the law as a guide for his or her 
conduct and in determining what is good (or right) behavior.   
5 This mechanism is often associated with ameliorating collective action problems (see Sunstein 1996). 
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These are the sort of phenomena that we will be attempting to measure here.  As seen above, 
there are various theories for explaining various channels for how such internalization might occur, 
e.g. via changed preferences (Cooter 1998, Etzioni 2000); utility from self-perception or self-image 
(Besley and Ghatak 2009)6; utility from conformity (Kaplow and Shavell 2007); utility from custom 
or convention (Lin and Yang 2006)7. Any of these approaches might provide the channel for 
internalization, and self-reported intrinsic motivation would occur.  We focus on measuring intrinsic 
motivation (irrespective of channel) and consequent internalization. That is, here we are exploring the 
specific question of the measurement of the existence of motivational change occurring as a 
consequence of legal change, and its link to behavior.  
There are many examples of experimental studies examining and measuring the impact of 
stated principles (norms, mores, laws) on internal motivation.  There are also numerous case studies 
demonstrating specific impacts of stated policies within particular types of organizations 
(governmental departments, public services).  To our knowledge, there is little evidence of the impact 
of specific expressions of legal change on individual motivation and behavior.8 
As mentioned, there are numerous experimental studies examining the general question of the 
manner in which principled statements impact upon motivational change.   (See e.g. Galbiati and 
Vertova, 2014; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2014; Romaniuc et al 2016, Romaniuc 
2016)   Galbiati and Vertova (2014) investigate the notion of “obligations” as norms, in which the 
subjects are informed of the contribution required to achieve the cooperative outcome.  They find that 
in this case behavior consistent with such norms can be sustained as observed outcomes, even when 
                                                            
6 For example, there is also a literature exploring the manner in which individuals might be motivated in the 
more particular context of case studies of specific organizational policies, e.g.  policies used to encourage 
professionalism in the operation of a public hospital or governmental department.  (Besley, Bevan and 
Burchardt 2009;  Kreps, 1997; Besley and Ghatak, 2016)  In these studies it has been argued that self-perceived 
reputational effects might afford an important conduit through which individual utility is received and, when 
this is the case, individual non-compliance with a stated norm might impact upon an individual’s own self-image 
and so detract from individual utility.  Such might be the basis for the effectiveness of such policies as “naming 
and shaming”.  (Besley and Ghatak  2016)   
7These authors argue that individuals might secure utility from acting in conformity with a custom or 
convention, and that law might be one means of enunciating an existing or desirable custom. 
8The one exception might be the abolition of Swiss voting laws.  There it was found that the withdrawal of the 
legal requirement for voting significantly reduced voter turn-out, even though the penalties under the law were 
nominal,  evidence that it was the language of the law that was operative. (Funk 2007) 
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inconsistent with the individual optimum.  Similarly, Tyran and Feld (2006) find that subjects will 
respond positively to principles adopted by the group, in that this encourages the expectation that 
other individuals will do likewise.  The Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) study pursues this idea, and 
observes the extent to which players cooperate in situations when some subjects are exposed to stated 
principles or norms (e.g. the “Golden Rule”), and other subjects are not.  They find that such general 
statements of principles may indeed be effective in motivating those individuals to behave more 
cooperatively, even in cases when the respondents know that the other players are not so informed.9    
These and other experiments provide substantial evidence that, in laboratory settings, there can be an 
impact of expressed principles on individual motivation, through various potential channels.10 
In terms of empirical work related specifically to the internalization of law, there is a 
substantial related literature that analyzes how the size of penalties impacts upon the response to 
social norms.11  Much of this work is also experimental.12  There are also studies examining how the 
provision of information regarding penalties impacts upon conformity with law (libraries, television 
licenses).13  We do not analyze the issue of varying penalties further here, since our example includes 
only the single change in penalty amount.14 
In sum, the literature on the capacity for stated principles to alter individual motivation has 
crossed many fields of study and has been discussed in many different contexts. There is much 
                                                            
9 The absence of other players’ exposure to the stated principle in some of the treatments is important because it 
translates the motivational question into one that is individual rather than reciprocal. The exposed individual is 
then assumed to be responding to altered internal motivations, rather than a changed perception on the 
likelihood of the other players’ responses.  
10 By way of contrast, other laboratory-based studies provide results that bring into question the impact of such 
expressions of law.  (Romaniuc 2016; Romaniuc et al 2016) 
11 The studies on penalties for tax compliance and evasion are voluminous.  (Kleven et. al. 2011; Fellner et. al. 
2013; Dwenger et. al. 2015)  These studies sometimes find that evasion of the legal duty can increase with the 
sanction. (Berger et. al 2016)   
12 Khadjavi (2014) has investigated whether pro-social behaviour is crowded out in with introduction of 
penalties in an experimental setting.  (see in general Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012) 
13A recent field experiment with library late fees found that notices that incorporated information on penalties 
increased compliance.  (Apesteguia et. al. 2013)  A similar result was found with regard to TV licensepayments.  
(Fellner et. al. 2013).  We provide some speculations on the manner in which the size of penalties might convey 
some information on the nature of the duty being conferred.  See the discussion of results in Section 5.  
14 Another set of related work focuses more on the question of how the stated quantum of the penalty or sanction 
may alter individual motivations.  (see Benabou and Tirole 2011a; Benabou and Tirole 2006)  It is based on the 
idea of individual morality and reputation developed by the same authors.  (Benabou and Tirole 2011b)  In this 
framework the individual receives direct utility from conforming with the expressed legal principle but this 
amount varies across individuals, and the penalty’s amount calls forth different levels of individual effort, as an 
altered wage might alter the amount of effort supplied within an organization.  
7 
 
agreement that some manner of impact on individual choice may be observed from the mere statement 
of principle, but little attempt has been made to make a precise and structured estimate of the 
phenomenon in the context of a specific legal change.  In terms of measuring the internalization of the 
law, and separating out between its priced-based and motivational effects on individual behavior, the 
empirical literature is for the most part silent. In the next section we set out how we propose to 
accomplish this task. 
3. Measuring Internalization of Legal Change:  Context and Method 
The legal context we investigate concerns the introduction of a mandatory plastic bag charge 
throughout England in 2015.15  Similar to what occurred in Ireland ten years earlier, the mandatory 
charge of 5 pence on plastic bags was implemented across England on 5 October 2015.16  Prior to 
this intervention, the regulation of this commodity in England was undertaken solely on a voluntary 
basis.17 The plastic bag charge went into effect for the expressed purpose of “eliminating the 
unnecessary use of this item.” 
The government took an active role in publicizing the reasoning behind the proposed charge.18 It 
made the case for the reduction of plastic bags being considered as an individual responsibility.  The 
                                                            
15 The Single Use Carrier Bags Charge (England) Order (2015).  The operative provision of this order provided 
as follows “A seller must charge a minimum of 5 pence (including any VAT) for each single use carrier bag 
supplied in the reporting year…” (Article 3).  Interestingly, the amount of the charge was the same in each of 
the neighboring jurisdictions adopting it (England, Wales, Scotland), which may be important for explaining the 
phenomenon of convergence that will be discussed in Section 5, below. 
16 From this date supermarkets and other large retailers in England were required by law to charge at least 5 
pence for single-use plastic carrier bags. The legislative change followed the introduction of mandatory charges 
being introduced in Wales in October 2011, Northern Ireland in April 2013, and Scotland in October 2014. 
17 Prior to the introduction of the mandatory charge, the government used voluntary schemes to try to reduce the 
use of plastic bags. In 2008 the British Retail Consortium signed a voluntary agreement which saw the 
distribution of plastic bags almost halve in 2009 compared to their peak in 2006 of 12.1 billion (House of 
Commons, 2014, WRAP, 2015). With the exception of one retailer (Marks & Spencer), who introduced a 
voluntary charge on plastic bags (discussed below), retailers agreed to reduce uptake of new plastic bags by 
making them less accessible to consumers. However, despite an initial reduction, plastic bag consumption 
resumed, increasing by approximately 4 per cent per annum to 8.5 billion in 2014 (WRAP, 2015). In explaining 
its decision to introduce the charge, the UK Government (2015) cited the fact that the use of plastic carrier bags 
had increased five years in a row. 
18 The charge was announced in September 2013; the then Deputy Prime Minister announced plans to introduce 
a mandatory five pence charge for single-use plastic carrier bags in England from Autumn 2015.  Following the 
announcement a Call for Evidence was publicized. As key aspects of the charge were already announced (most 
importantly the magnitude of the charge) the consultation focused on types of bags to be included and 
compliance issues.  185 responses were received from industry groups; NGOs; local authorities; academics; and 
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government stated that single use plastic carrier bags “take longer than other bags to degrade in the 
environment, can damage wildlife, and are extremely visible when littered in our towns, parks and the 
countryside.” (UK Government, 2015) The government also publicized the social benefits from 
minimizing plastic bag usage - £6 million per year in savings from litter clean-up costs and £1.3 
million per year in carbon savings.19  In undertaking this pre-implementation phase of publicity, the 
government was making the policy widely-known as a social responsibility and encouraging public 
acceptance.20   
In order to measure the impact of this legal change on individuals in England, and to separate 
out between its direct and indirect components, we proceed as follows. First, we define the 
internalization of law as a process that involves a change in the individual’s intrinsic motivation to 
choose action in conformity with the statement of law.21  So, in our context (of a new law penalizing 
the use of new plastic bags), we consider that internalization occurs if the change in law increases an 
individual's self-reported intrinsic motivation toward using fewer new bags.   
Three successive cross-sectional surveys of the UK population were undertaken in order to 
procure the required information on attitudes and consumption.22 The required charge for plastic bags 
came into force in England on October 5th, 2015. To assess consumption and attitudes just before the 
introduction of the charge, the first survey took place on the 29th-30th of September 2015.23 A second 
survey collected data one week after the introduction of the policy, on the 13th-14th of October 2015. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
private individuals (2000 emails were also received).  The majority of the respondents supported the 
introduction of a charge on plastic bags.  The House of Commons Audit Committee also produced a report into 
the proposal and made a public call for witnesses. 
19 In addition retailers are required to donate the funds raised to ‘good causes’, resulting in projected receipts of 
£73 million per annum for charity.   
20 These are two of the conditions that Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) argue are necessary to create this 
effect, publicity and public observation of non-compliants.  Public acceptance of a law was shown to be 
important to self-implemention in Feld and Tyran (2006). 
21 The operational statement here is that the intrinsic motivation of the individual is altered by the statement of 
law, irrespective of the precise channel through which this change in motivation occurs. 
22 We do not know of any comparable pre-trend data, and so our analysis focuses only on the data generated in 
our surveys, which comprised of a single wave prior to the legislative change.  However, it is instructive to note 
that the UK’s Waste and Resources Action Program (WRAP) collects aggregate data at the country level at 
yearly intervals.  This data shows that, prior to the plastic bag charge being introduced in England, bag usage 
was trending upwards in all three jurisdictions (England, Wales, Scotland).  Their data also demonstrates a sharp 
decline in bag usage in each jurisdiction following introduction of the charge.  (see www.wrap.org.uk) 
23 It should be noted that the introduction of charge was known in advance, so it is possible that some 
internalization could have occurred prior to the charge actually coming into force. Therefore, the results capture 
the effect of the charge actually being implemented. 
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A final round was implemented seven weeks after the introduction of the carrier bag charge (24th-25th 
November, 2015) to capture the longer-term impact of the policy on behavior. This survey, identical 
across periods, collected information on the consumption of plastic bags, plus personal attitudes 
towards plastic bag use and its regulation. To ensure the availability of bag consumption data both 
before and after the policy was introduced, the survey used a standard recall question: consumers 
were asked to report the number of carrier bags they used or acquired on their last grocery shopping 
trip.24,25 (Browning et al., 2003) 
The survey was implemented by an established online market research company26, whose UK 
panel contains over 350,000 respondents varying widely by age, gender, education, and income. To 
obtain nationally representative samples, the survey used a quota-sampling strategy that set quotas for 
age, gender, and regional distribution of the population to match UK characteristics in each wave.  
Statistical analysis (median tests) demonstrates that respondents in the three waves do not differ 
significantly from one another, in terms of income (p=0.474), or education (p=0.716), indicating that 
the sample selection strategy operated in accordance with the design. The survey data also show that 
consumers moved across stores, with individuals visiting an average of 4 different retailer brands over 
a four-week period preceding the interview. This distribution and the sampling strategy set out before 
indicates that the sample can be expected to be reasonably representative of UK consumers, and that it 
remains relatively stable across the survey period.27,28 
                                                            
24 Prior to the introduction of the charge, plastic bags were not individually charged and they were not scanned 
at the till (they had no bar code) nor recorded by the cashier, so there was little record of their consumption at 
the retail level.  But see the discussion of pre-survey data in footnote 21.  
25 Self-reported measures of behaviour are known to carry a downward bias (Schwarz, 1999, Browning et al., 
2003), particularly when consumption is considered socially undesirable (e.g. alcohol in Feunekes et al., 1999). 
Consumption from recall can be accurate if the questionnaire is designed correctly: recalling a specific event, 
which has occurred recently, and having no time restriction to answer the question has been shown to give more 
precise measures of behaviour (Schwarz and Oyserman, 2001). As a result, respondents were asked to base their 
recall on their last grocery shopping trip and were given a scale to facilitate the task. The same recall approach 
was used to generate behavioural data. 
26 ResearchNow (www.researchnow.org.uk) 
27 We recognize that the choice of control group is crucial to obtain unbiased estimates using a difference-in-
difference estimator (as we do here), due to unobservable preferences for the environment varying across 
groups. Specifically, if the control group includes a disproportionate number of individuals who hold strong 
preferences for the environment before the legislative change is introduced, this could result in the failure to 
reject a false null hypothesis (a type II error) by showing little change after the policy is introduced. Similarly, 
the incorrect inclusion of individuals who are initially unexposed to the charge in the control group would result 
10 
 
The survey was short and straightforward. (See Survey in Appendix A.) It consisted of twenty-
one questions. Five of these concerned individual demographics (income, household, etc). Five others 
concerned recent plastic bag consumption. Seven concerned the individual’s attitude toward the use of 
plastic bags, and toward the legal change. Four final questions concerned the broader context of 
individual choice regarding plastic bag consumption (substitutes for bags etc). All participants 
completed the survey in 5 minutes or less. 
The idea of our experiment is to use the legal change regarding plastic bags to assess both how 
bag usage and how consumer attitudes were changing over the first two months of the new regime; in 
doing so, we then wish to separate out between those effects of the law caused by inculcation of 
values and those caused by the law itself (including the penalty). In order to accomplish this objective, 
each survey collected information on preferences/attitudes (on scales from zero to 100). Specifically, 
we focus on a measure for internalization or intrinsic motivation, measured by an attitudinal question 
included in the survey assessing the individual respondent’s level of agreement with the statement 
“Minimizing the number of plastic carrier bags when I shop for groceries is important to me, 
regardless of any benefit or inconvenience that may result to me.” We consider that this attitudinal 
indicator captures the internalized motivational effect from compliance with the objectives of 
the law.  The idea being that there exists a distinct flow of benefits to the respondent from 
that individual’s observance of the law, irrespective of any other benefits/costs that may flow 
from the chosen behavior.29    
The impact of the plastic bag charge initially is identified using a differences-in-differences 
(DID) estimator across treatment and control jurisdictions. In fact, this type of estimator requires 
variability in the sample along two dimensions: firstly, the sample should contain information of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in a significant change in consumption in response to the legislative change, favouring the incorrect rejection of 
a true null hypothesis (a type I error).  The sampling method must attempt to randomize adequately to avoid 
such in-built biases across treatments and controls. 
28 Note that we have tested for robustness, in regard to our selection of treatment and controls, by repeating our 
exercise, with little difference in results. See Appendix B for a description of our robustness checks and results. 
29 We posit that this indicator captures reported internalized individual motivation to avoid plastic bag 
consumption, motivated by the desire to conform to the new law and/or to adopt the law as a personal objective 
(i.e. to reduce the use of plastic bags) or via one of the other channels listed discussed above. 
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behavior before and after the policy is introduced; secondly, in both periods the sample should include 
a number of individuals who are not affected by the policy when implemented, which represent a 
control group against which changes are compared (Bertrand et al., 2004). The market in the UK 
presented institutional differences enabling just such a quasi-experimental design: Wales introduced a 
plastic bag charge on the 1st of October 2011, followed by Northern Ireland on the 1st of April 2013, 
and by Scotland on the 20th of October 2014. Since these are neighboring jurisdictions to the subject 
population, and our survey was conducted before and after the introduction of the law, a differences-
in-differences analysis is appropriate in this setting. 
In sum, the dataset from our survey contains the essence of a quasi-experiment. The plastic 
bags charge legislation impacted only English consumers (the “treatment group”). The remainder of 
the sample is from neighboring jurisdictions without the new (English) charge – subjects in the 
Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh jurisdictions (the “control group”).30  The survey was implemented 
over eight weeks – one week before the legal change and one seven weeks after the change.  This sort 
of variation across two dimensions is what is required in order to undertake a reasonably controlled 
experimental analysis of the causes behind changes in individual motivation. In the next section we 
examine the results from this experiment. 
4.  Results: Estimating Behavioral Change and Internalization 
The results reported here concern the manner in which the legal change impacted behavior (4.1), 
the evidence for the internalization of law (4.2), and the separation of the aggregate behavioral change 
into components attributable to intrinsic motivation and to the price-based effect of the new sanctions 
(4.3).   
4.1 General Impact of the Legal Change 
                                                            
30 Those in the control group were already subject to a charge, both in terms of an existing price per bag and 
their own distinct legal provisions.  In most instances, the control group are un-treated rather than previously 
treated subjects in regard to the policy change.  In order to investigate whether this distinction makes a 
difference in this context, we do various robustness checks in Appendix B. 
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A first question related to the introduction of the charge concerns the measurable impact of this 
legal intervention, measured in terms of plastic bag consumption (new and re-used) in the treated 
jurisdiction (England). Table 1 shows that on average total plastic bag use in England (the treatment 
group) decreased slightly overall in the weeks following the introduction of the charge, going from 
4.58 to 4.20 units per person. On the other hand, average consumption of new plastic bags fell about 
45%, from around 2.80 units per person per trip to just over 1.45 bags.    This is an important 
difference, in that the law applies only to new plastic bags, and to the reduction in their use. 
Table 1: Mean behavioral and attitudinal variables in the sample 
 Variable Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Kruskal 
Wallis - chi2 
Control Bag used – All 3.99 3.86 4.10 0.09 
 Bag used – New 1.26 1.56 1.40 1.36 
 Reusable bag – 
carried 
1.22 1.26 1.24 0.57 
 Reusable bag – 
purchased  
1.79 1.66 1.73 5.99+ 
 Intrinsic motivation 71.49 69.97 68.37 0.42 
Treated  Bag used – All 4.58 4.47 4.20 4.72+ 
 Bag used – New 2.80 1.97 1.45 113.90** 
 Reusable bag – 
carried 
1.41 1.29 1.25 45.19** 
 Reusable bag – 
purchased  
1.76 1.69 1.72 8.90* 
 Intrinsic motivation 63.44 66.30 64.75 3.75 
 Observations 900 900 904  
Significance levels are denoted as follows: +p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
Table 1 also summarizes the individually reported changes in intrinsic motivation toward the 
use of plastic bags. These show significantly different trends for treatment and control groups. 
Specifically, respondents in the control group reported a slight and steady but insignificant (p=0.81) 
decline in intrinsic motivation over time; while respondents in the treatment group show an overall 
increase over the course of the experiment (of marginal significance, i.e. p=0.15), but with an initially 
large and significant increase in intrinsic motivation (p=0.05).  So, an interesting impact is occurring 
in the treatment group, primarily at the time of the law’s initial adoption, and tapering off thereafter.   
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It is important to note that these univariate tests only demonstrate the general nature of 
changes occurring across time, but the actual impact of the policy should be measured as the 
difference in this change across the two groups, to which we turn now.  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the consumption of both new and all plastic bags in the three survey periods in the 
differing jurisdictions.31 The consumption of new plastic bags has declined much more rapidly in the 
treatment group, dropping from 2.80 to 1.45 while the control group’s consumption from the sample 
increased slightly from an average of 1.26 to 1.40 new bags. The impact of the new law is clearly 
observable in the way that the treated jurisdiction responds regarding the use of new bags, relative to 
the behavior observable in the control jurisdictions.32 
Figure 1: Impact of Law on Behavior over Time – Control and Treatment Jurisdictions 
  
                                                            
31 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the distribution of total plastic bags used in the sample did not 
change significantly over time, while the distribution of new bags shifted toward zero. Figure 1 shows that 
individuals previously unexposed to the mandatory charge showed both a decline in total as well as new plastic 
bags (p-values for trend equal to 0.022 and 0.000, respectively). 
32 The intervention had little impact on the overall use of plastic bags.  Oddly, there is a significant effect on the 
uptake of all plastic bags (p-value for trend = 0.000) in the control group (i.e. consumers previously paying for 
their use), but not for the treatment group (p-value for trend = 0.916). Overall, the trends are fairly flat.  This is 
to be expected since the law addressed only the use of “new bags”. 
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4.2  Testing for the Existence of Internalization of Law 
We turn now to the seminal question addressed in this paper: the existence of a discernible 
impact of the internalization of law.  We can see this immediately, looking at the impact of the legal 
change across jurisdictions, both treatment and controls, in terms of the change in reported intrinsic 
motivation. 
Figure 2 presents the trends in intrinsic motivation for control and treatments separately, 
confirming the patterns and significances discussed in the previous section. Internalized motivations 
jumped sharply in the treatment group immediately upon introduction of the law.  This is compared to 
a general downward trend in motivation amongst the control group. After this initial jump in 
internalized motivations among the treatment group, intrinsic motivation then moves in line with the 
general trend of the control.   
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Figure 2: Impact of Law on Intrinsic Motivation over Time – Control and Treatments 
 
Interestingly, a sort of alignment between treatment and controls is observable in terms of both 
motivation and in actual consumption over the course of the experiment. That is, the overall effect of 
the intervention seems to be bringing the two groups (control and treatment) into alignment regarding 
the regulated behavior – both jurisdictions arriving at the use of an average of about 1.4 new bags per 
week (and 4 bags overall per week), from very different starting points. Likewise, reported levels of 
intrinsic motivation increased in England and declined in the other jurisdictions, converging 
somewhere in the upper 60s (out of 100).  
 In order to ascertain whether these differences between groups are indeed significant, we 
undertake a formalized difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. In doing so, we define plastic bag 
consumption of individual i in group s (control, treatment) at time t as 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡. The total impact of the 
policy on the target consumers can then be written as the difference in consumption between those 
individuals previously unexposed to the charge compared to the difference in consumption for the 
group of those individuals who were exposed to the charge at an earlier point in time (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009), as follows:  
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   )0,0()1,0()0,1()1,1( ==−==−==−=== tsYtsYtsYtsY iiii   (2) 
Equation (2) represents a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator of the impact of the 
legislative change, which is the difference between the change in plastic bags use observed in the 
treatment (England)  )0,1()1,1( ==−== tsYtsY ii , and the change in plastic bags use measured 
in the control group  )0,0()1,0( ==−== tsYtsY ii .33 This effect is estimated by the regression 
(Bertrand et al., 2004):  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑠 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡       (3) 
where A refers to group-specific fixed effects, capturing systematic differences between control group 
and the initially unexposed group (e.g. different plastic bags needs); B refers to time-specific fixed 
effects that capture the presence of the plastic bags charge if t > 0; and ε is the error term. In equation 
(3), I refers to the interaction term between the treatment dummy (equal to one for those initially 
unexposed to the charge) and the legislative change dummy. Then, β captures the impact of the 
legislative change, measuring the change in consumption of people exposed to the plastic bag charge 
for the first time relative to the control group who were previously exposed to the charge.34 
Table 2 presents the results of the difference-in-differences estimation. The results demonstrate 
that the change in law had a large and significant impact on the use of new plastic bags in the 
treatment jurisdiction (England).  Compared to the control group (and including the effect of 
internalized motivation), it can be seen that new plastic bag use fell by around 1.8 bags one week after 
the charge was introduced and by 2.5 bags seven weeks after. 35  It is also noteworthy that both 
coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level.  As would be expected, the impact on total plastic 
bags use is much more modest, with a decline of around 0.5 bags per person per trip in the last round 
                                                            
33 In this representation, s refers to the jurisdiction under examination (s=1 is treatment; s=0 is control) and t 
refers to the treatment (t=1 is exposure to the treatment; t=0 is non-exposure). 
34 Importantly, the presence of different time periods causes a problem of serial autocorrelation of the residuals 
𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (Bertrand et al., 2004); this problem can be significantly mitigated by clustering residuals by period 
(Wooldridge, 2003). 
35 As expected, the impact on overall use of plastic bags is smaller relative to that of new plastic bags, since it is 
the use of the latter that is actually regulated. 
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of surveys.  In line with the intended purpose of the legal change, this suggests that consumers are 
recycling their plastic carrier bags, rather than vastly minimizing their use per se.  
The change in regulatory framework also has an impact on intrinsic motivation: first, intrinsic 
motivation increases by 3.67 points the week after the introduction of the charge (listed under 
England*Wave 2), halving the 7.61 difference in (reduced) motivation that formerly characterized 
English consumers; second, this increase in motivation remains almost unchanged after 7 weeks (at 
3.41 - and listed under England*Wave3).  It is noteworthy that these coefficients are also significant 
at the 1 per cent level.      
Table 2: Impact of the charge on use of plastic bags – with and without internalization 
 All bags  New bags  Intrinsic 
motivations 
 Without With 
internalization 
Without With 
internalization 
 
Regression Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS 
Intercept 5.9698** 6.6013** 4.5727** 6.7660** 55.0519** 
           S.E. 0.2847 0.2290 0.3562 0.1737 2.3584 
England (treatment group) 0.8837** 0.7946** 3.3175** 2.9740** -7.6136* 
           S.E. 0.1930 0.1679 0.4328 0.4200 1.1364 
Wave 2 -0.1423** -0.1527** 0.3986** 0.3772** -1.0763+ 
           S.E. 0.0333 0.0381 0.0914 0.0996 0.3458 
Policy, week 2 (England*Wave 2) 0.0585 0.0995+ -1.9204** -1.7934** 3.6744** 
           S.E. 0.0387 0.0548 0.1422 0.1475 0.2292 
Wave 3 -0.0020 -0.0261 -0.3103** -0.4389** -2.1483** 
           S.E. 0.0072 0.0214 0.0608 0.0370 0.2038 
Policy, week 7 (England*Wave 3) -0.4531** -0.4123** -2.7369** -2.5334** 3.4110** 
           S.E. 0.0110 0.0338 0.0861 0.0991 0.2141 
Intrinsic motivation - -0.0114+ - -0.0388** - 
           S.E. - 0.0062 - 0.0061 - 
Age -0.0340** -0.0311** -0.1062** -0.0970** 0.2542* 
           S.E. 0.0029 0.0032 0.0117 0.0120 0.0358 
Male -0.4260 -0.4749+ 0.6320 0.4726 -4.2476+ 
           S.E. 0.2623 0.2528 0.4882 0.4782 1.0020 
Northern Ireland -0.0233 0.0120 0.3008 0.4028 2.9632 
           S.E. 0.3374 0.3727 1.4274 1.4072 3.5438 
Scotland 0.2202 0.2043 -0.2086 -0.3118 -0.8853 
           S.E. 0.2686 0.2793 0.5855 0.5606 1.6380 
Wales Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
           S.E. - - - - - 
Sigma 10.4791** 10.3852** 22.3649** 21.2976** - 
           S.E. 0.6712 0.5791 1.6233 1.8450 - 
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Observations 2704 2704 2704 2704 2704 
Pseudo R2 0.0186 0.0205 0.0526 0.0638  
Log-likelihood -6387.84 -6375.48 -4784.77 -4728.36 -12794.75 
R2     0.0477 
Significance levels are denoted as follows: +p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. Bags consumption equations are 
estimated using a Tobit regression; while the motivation equation uses an OLS. Note: in all regressions, 
residuals are clustered by period (equivalent standard errors are obtained when clustering by jurisdiction of legal 
change). Regressions area also adjusted by income (9 dummies, corresponding to the reported income band); 
and education (6 dummies, corresponding to the reported highest level of education attained). Treated Group 
refers to respondents within jurisdictions of legal change. Period i refers to respondents to ith survey.  Policy, 
time i refers to respondents within treated group in period i.  
 
Is there a discernible impact of intrinsic motivation on behavior?  While intrinsic motivation 
has no impact on the total consumption of plastic bags (which would be driven by other factors, such 
has household size, or purpose of the shopping trip), motivation has a modest but significant impact 
on the rate of use of new plastic bags.  This may be seen in Table 2 by comparing the columns 
labelled “with internalization” and “without”, as an increase in intrinsic motivation is seen in the 
former column to result in a reduction of 0.0388 new bags consumed per unit of self-reported 
increased motivation.  So, the difference-in-differences analysis demonstrates that reported increases 
in internal motivation – occurring in the jurisdiction with the change in law – are directly inducing 
changes in behavior regarding the use of new plastic bags.36 
4.3 Mediation Analysis:  Measuring the Internalization of Law 
We have seen that the legal change impacted behavior regarding the regulated activity 
(reduction in new plastic bags), and that this may be linked to reported changes in intrinsic 
motivation. This evidence generally supports the belief in the internalization of law.  Now we would 
like to explore the relative amount of the observed change in behavior that may be attributed to the 
increase in intrinsic motivation, occurring at the time of the expressed principle of legal change. 
We do this by considering the impact of the introduction of the carrier bag charge on reported 
intrinsic motivations, as reported by our survey respondents. The fifth column of Table 2 presents the 
                                                            
36 As will be detailed in the discussion concerning DID below (fns. 38-39 ), this form of analysis is quasi-
experimental in nature and designed to afford evidence of a causal relationship, so it is accurate here to speak of 
increased internal motivation causing a reduction in the use of new plastic bags. 
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estimates of the impact of the plastic bag charge on intrinsic motivations using the difference-in-
difference estimator of equation (3). There are numerous interesting observations to be made about 
how attitudes are shifting. First, intrinsic motivations are increasing only in the treated jurisdictions; 
however, the data sees a slight decline in intrinsic motivation in wave 3 that is affecting all 
respondents. Nevertheless, the difference in the change in motivation across the two groups is 
significant in both survey periods, and remains reasonably stable over time. Importantly, while 
intrinsic motivations have a statistically weak impact on the overall consumption of plastic bags, as 
expected they are a strong driver of the decision to consume fewer new plastic bags.  
These results indicate that the intervention has two effects: this change in law has resulted in 
differences across jurisdictions (treatment and control) both in regard to changes in behavior (the 
amount of the regulated activity) and changes in attitudes (self-reported intrinsic motivation to adopt 
the legal change).  To ascertain the contribution of changed attitudes to changed behaviors, we use 
mediation analysis (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986, MacKinnon et al., 2007).   Results in table 2 indicate 
that this approach is appropriate: as expected, the introduction of intrinsic motivation to the DID 
regression (i.e. the “with internalization” results) reduces the magnitude of the coefficients estimating 
the impact of the legal change, an indication that part of the total effect of the policy is actually driven 
by changes in the attitudinal structure or motivation of the individual shopper. 
A mediating factor is one that stands between the independent and dependent variable, and acts 
as a conduit for transmission of the effects of one on to the other.  By allowing for the existence of a 
mediator, the approach attempts to quantify the contribution given by the change in that mediator 
(here, intrinsic motivation), and the contribution given by other more direct factors.  Figure 3 
graphically represents these two effects (termed direct and indirect), as defined by the mediation 
analysis and with reference to the coefficients estimated using the equations below. In practice, this 
approach tests the relative contribution of a so-called the mediator variable on a given dependent 
variable (here, the role of intrinsic motivation in affecting new plastic bag usage).  That is, the 
mediator is a conduit that transmits in part the impact of a given stimulus (here, the change in law) 
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upon a dependent variable (plastic bags consumption), and mediation analysis is the method by which 
the relative contributions of the mediator and other more direct factors are ascertained. 
It is important to note that the mediation analysis is not sufficient in itself to identify 
causal effects, which can be obtained only if the underlying behavioral model is structurally 
identified (see, e.g., Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto 2015; MacKinnon et al. 2007).37  We 
follow the existing literature in making the assumption that motivation drives behaviour, although the 
precise nature of this relationship remains a question for further research.38   (Fishbach, Eyal, and 
Finkelstein 2010)  However, the key intuition underlying our approach here is that 
identification arises out of the method supplied by the precursor difference-in-differences 
(DID) analysis. DID design identifies the effect of the new law by eliding any other factors resulting 
in changes (in both motivation and plastic bag use) occasioned within the control group, leaving only 
the impact of the treatment to be observed within the treatment group (see, e.g., Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009).39 With the above assumption regarding the nature of motivation effects and 
identification supplied by the DID analysis, the mediation analysis is then just a means by 
which to separate out the relative contribution of the regulatory change to observed impacts.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
37 In our analysis, the link between motivation and behavior is not structurally defined: unobservable preferences 
may simultaneously determine the amount of intrinsic motivation and the number of bags purchased, a 
simultaneity that we do not address because of the nature of the residuals in OLS and Tobit; moreover, 
behaviour may influence motivation, resulting in reverse causality problems (e.g., Ariely and Norton 2008). 
38 If endogeneity is present in the manner discussed above (Ariely and Norton 2008), the estimated indirect 
effect might change depending on the bias on the coefficient - if behaviour increases motivation, the bias is 
upward; if doing good demotivates doing further good, there is a downward bias. We leave this point to future 
research, as we are not able to give more than a speculative answer to this very interesting question. 
39As a quasi-experimental design, the difference-in-difference design identifies causal effects in any underlying 
behavioural model, as long as the group allocation is exogenous: in our case, causal identification of the policy 
change dummy holds as long as the decision to live in England is not related to plastic bags use and to the 
motivation to reduce plastic bags, after adjusting for all relevant covariates.   
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Figure 3: Relationship between policy change and behavior 
 
Adapted from Ludwig et al. (2011), page 19.  
To perform the mediation analysis, behavior is modelled as a system of two equations. Firstly, 
consumption is modelled by extending equation (3) to adjust for the role of motivation X on demand 
as 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑠
′ + 𝐵𝑡
′ + 𝛽′𝐼𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾′𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡     (4) 
Similarly, internal motivation X can be modelled as   
𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑠 + 𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑠𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡      (5) 
where C and F reflect group-specific and time-specific motivational fixed effects.  
Figure 3 shows the direct effect and the indirect (attitudinal or motivation-based) effect 
obtained from the estimates of equations (4) and (5).  The introduction of the plastic bag law and 
charge has a direct effect that reduces the use of plastic bags by β’ units (equation (4)). The charge 
also has an indirect effect: the legislative change increases (decreases) the average internalized 
motivation in the sample by α units (equation (5)) and because each unit of motivation influences 
behavior by δ units (equation (4)), the charge will further reduce (increase) consumption by α·δ units. 
Merging equations (4) and (5), we then obtain the aggregate equation  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = (𝐴𝑠
′ + 𝛿𝐶𝑠) + (𝐵𝑡
′ + 𝛿𝐹𝑡) + (𝛽
′ + 𝛿𝛼)𝐼𝑠𝑡 + (𝛿𝜑 + 𝛾′)𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + (𝛿𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡)  (6) 
which is equivalent to equation (3). In equation (6), the total effect of the policy is 
Direct effect (β’) 
α δ 
Mediator 
(Motivation) 
Legislative change 
(Plastic bag charge)  
Outcome  
(Plastic bags use) 
Indirect (attitudinal) effect        
(α·δ) 
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 ?̂? = (𝛽′ + 𝛿𝛼)          (7) 
which is the sum of a direct effect (𝛽′) and an indirect effect (𝛿𝛼). The standard error of the indirect 
effect equals 2222   +=  (Krull and McKinnon, 2001).
40   
The results of the mediation analysis are reported below in Table 3. These estimates indicate 
that the reported motivational effect is a very small but significant contributor to the overall change in 
new plastic bag use. Specifically, one week after the charge was introduced, the impact of the law 
attributable to reported changes in motivations accounts for a reduction of around 0.07 new plastic 
bags per person per trip, against a non-attributed reduction of 0.91 new bags. Seven weeks after the 
policy was introduced, the attributed effect of the policy decreased very mildly in absolute value, 
causing a reduction of 0.06  new plastic bags per person per trip, against a non-attributed reduction of 
around 1.15  new bags.  This means that the relative contribution of the change in intrinsic motivation 
represents about 5 to 8% of the total change in behavior.  
Table 3: Mediation Analysis - direct and indirect effects of law on behavior 
  New Bags   
 Period Effect S.E. % 
Direct effect of policy 1 -0.9099** 0.0662 92.98% 
 2 -1.1522** 0.0287 94.75% 
Indirect effect via  1 -0.0687** 0.0124 7.02% 
Intrinsic motivation 2 -0.0638** 0.0115 5.25% 
Total effects 1 -0.9786** 0.0674  
 2 -1.2159** 0.0309  
Significance is as follows: + = 0.10; * = 0.05; ** = 0.01. Note that in the mediation analysis the policy 
coefficients from the Tobit equation are entered as the marginal effects of the censored value, instead of the 
coefficients of table 2, following the correction indicated by Puhani (2012); this adjustment is required to obtain 
a statistically consistent estimate of the DID when marginal effects are non-linear in the dependent variable. 
  
The results from our mediation analysis demonstrate that there is a clear internalization effect 
of law-making in this instance, as measured by the self-reported changes in attitudes of those 
                                                            
40 Notably, mediation analysis identifies causal effects only if two conditions hold (Keele et al., 2015). First, the 
charge has to be randomly assigned, i.e. the treatment variable D in equation (4) has to be unrelated to 
unobservable preferences for plastic bags after adjusting for covariates. Secondly, attitudes must be exogenous 
to the behaviour given the remaining covariates, i.e. the main relation is structural. These points are discussed in 
more detail in section 7, when some robustness checks test whether these two conditions hold. 
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individuals subjected to the new law. Although only able to explain about 5-8% of the overall change 
in behavior, the associated change is clear and significant. We are able to conclude that, in this case, 
law has a measurable own-effect due to reported intrinsic motivation, and it appears to be reasonably 
stable over time.41 
5. Discussion  
This study sheds light on whether the internalization of law “exists”. Many commentators cited 
the legal change related to the introduction of a plastic bag charge in Ireland as an example of the type 
that might register a significant impact via changed motivations.  (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012). 
We have investigated the impact of a similar change in law in England in 2015 and we have been able 
to separate out between the direct price and indirect motivational effects. We found that indeed the 
change in law has fundamentally changed the way a significant proportion of consumers report their 
own levels of intrinsic motivation in response to the new law.  
Another important enquiry concerns the relative contribution of changed motivations 
relative to other factors driving behavioral modification. Our main result in this regard 
derives from our mediation analysis which finds that the change in behavior attributable to 
changed values commences initially at about 8% of the total behavior change, and then ends 
at about 5% after almost two months of the law being in effect.  This is a relatively small part 
of the impact of the charge, and highlights the importance of the direct price effect.  It must 
be remembered, however, that while 5 pence is a small amount of money, it is considerably 
more than the production cost of a single use plastic bag (and probably about 5 times 
higher).42  In the context of goods with high price elasticity and substantial percentage 
                                                            
41 Law has a measurable “own-effect” here, defined as an effect purely associated with the reported change in 
intrinsic motivations. 
 
42 Based on cost and compliance data supplied to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(2017) by supermarkets, the average cost of a single use plastic bag to supermarkets is approximately 1 
penny.  Other (older) estimates have also placed the cost at approximately the same level (Conway 
2007).  Assuming competitive grocery retailing, and before a legal charge was introduced, the average shopper 
should have been expecting to pay about the production cost for each bag, i.e. about 1 pence. With the 
introduction of the 5 pence charge, the 500 per cent increase in the price paid for a bag would be expected to 
induce a substantial response, assuming that there were ready substitutes available for new bags (such as 
reusable bags or previously acquired bags). In addition, given that many consumers may have seen the price of a 
new bag as zero, rather than the on-average 1 pence, the response might have been expected to be even more 
substantial. 
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increases in the price, it seems reasonable to expect large behavioral changes to be brought 
about by direct price effects.43     
While being relatively small in magnitude, we nevertheless find that there is clear-cut, 
significant evidence of the existence of internalized motivations to act in conformance with 
the law’s objectives.  This finding is important as it is an early example of the measurement 
of the actual internalization of law, as opposed to its inferral from observed behavioral 
change.   
There are other interesting aspects of the English plastic bag charge case study.  It is 
noteworthy in this case, that many of the factors that are often associated with the successful 
change of internal attitudes were present in the adoption of this law, including a high degree 
of perceived legitimacy regarding the legislative authority. (see Bilz and Nadler 2014)  
Importantly, the government also took a proactive role in expressing the reasoning behind the 
charge by publicly announcing it as a social responsibility, in particular highlighting the third 
party environmental costs associated with plastic bag use.   These are important determinants 
in what makes for cost-effective law-making and implementation. 
Finally, it is interesting that all jurisdictions are attaining the same equilibrium after the 
introduction of the law in terms of bag use, despite the fact that the new sanction was introduced in 
different jurisdictions at different points in time.  This results in part from the fact that the charge in 
all jurisdictions (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) was precisely the same (5 pence), 
and also from the observation that the price-based response to the charge was much of the reason for 
the reduction in bag consumption.44  
In drawing these conclusions we note that there are a number of limitations associated 
with our study, including the potential for self-reporting bias and the likelihood of different 
levels of attention and media coverage, pre-, post- and during the implementation of the 
charge. We also believe that there may be substantial grounds for further research in the 
                                                            
43 It is also noteworthy that for the much cited Irish plastic bag levy, the initial charge there was more than 10 
times the production costs (Convery et al 2007, Conway 2007), demonstrating that price-effects were likely the 
reason for much of the behavioral change in that case as well. 
44 Given that the sanction was non-varying, and that many other unknown factors would be involved in the 
explanation of the phenomenon of convergence in bag consumption (e.g. local customs and attitudes, 
monitoring, perceived legitimacy of legislation, etc), we leave the question of convergence aside for future 
research. 
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general area of internalized motivations.  One aspect that we have considered but not yet 
reached conclusions concerns the relative impact of legal change on various sub-groups (by 
age, by gender, by income), and how internalization varies with such characteristics.45   
Another aspect of importance concerns the policy-relevance of internalization, and how 
governments and law-makers might be able to make it a more effective tool in cost-effective 
regulation.  Many authors have written on this, and we have noted a few of the relevant 
factors present in regard to law-making in England in this case, but structured study of actual 
policy-making and implementation remains to be done.  Nonetheless we consider this study 
to be an early advance in ascertaining the existence of internalized motivations, and 
measuring the extent to which the objectives of law are internalized through such 
motivations.   
6. Conclusion 
Why do laws have effect?   Do we sit at red stoplights in the middle of the night on account of 
internalized motivations, or the threat of governmental sanctions?  
It has been hypothesized that a new law can have both effects, sometimes expressing the common 
duties of a populace and other times providing prices for regulated behaviors. We have reported on an 
experiment to test this hypothesis in the context of the introduction of a plastic bag charge in England 
in 2015.  In short, we find that the announcement of a bag charge in England did indeed have an 
immediate impact on behavior, changing the way in which agents used new bags in a very short 
amount of time.  Here we have used a policy-based quasi-experiment to demonstrate how the 
introduction of a new law resulted in immediate changes in behaviors regarding the regulated conduct. 
 
                                                            
45 Our initial results demonstrate that while the consumption of new plastic bags was significantly impacted by 
the age of the respondent (with response declining with age), the internalization of motives was not.   These 
results are available from the authors on request. 
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In addition, we have attempted to measure the relative extent to which the behavioral change was 
attributable to the internalization of the law.  We did this through a mediation analysis of stated 
changes in intrinsic motivation.  We found the scale of the behavioral change attributed to intrinsic 
motivation shifts by respondents was relatively minor but significant, contributing less than ten 
percent of the total impact in changed behavior over the two months of our survey.  
    We conclude that in this case the two systems (intrinsic and economic) work together within 
society’s conception of law.  Changes in law that incorporate economic incentives (such as fines, 
sanctions or charges) also may act - in part - as purely internalized law, altering the way that the 
populace views its own duties and obligations.   Changes in behavior derive from both – the threat of 
sanctions and the internalization of motivations. 
 Overall, the internalization of law is an important tool in the effective implementation of law 
and regulation.  We have noted that the English government undertook many of the actions that are 
hypothesized to be effective in generating high levels of intrinsic motivation, and it is in part a result 
of these actions that the plastic bag charge was taken on board by the people within that jurisdiction.  
It is certainly cost-effective to have the citizenry simply “follow the leader” in the adoption of 
socially-beneficial behavior patterns, and it will be interesting to pursue further precisely which 
parameters (policies, prices) determine the degree of own-effect of new laws. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Demographics 
1) Where do you live in the UK? (England; Northern Ireland; Scotland; Wales) 
2) What is your age? 
3) What is your yearly income (before taxes)? (Below £ 15,000; £ 15,000-£ 20,000; £ 20,001-
£ 30,000; £ 30,001-£ 40,000; £ 40,001-£ 50,000; £ 60,001-£ 60,000; £ 50,001-£ 70,000; 
Above £ 70,000; I prefer not to say) 
4) What gender do you identify with? (Male; Female) 
5) What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Basic education; Secondary 
education; University degree – undergraduate level (e.g. BSc, BA); University degree – 
Master level or equivalent (e.g. MSc, MA, MRes); University degree – Doctoral level 
(PhD); Other - please specify) 
Behavioural questions 
6) In which of the following retailers have you been grocery shopping in the last month 
(choose as many as you need)? (Asda; Aldi; Co-operative; Iceland; Marks & Spencer; 
Morrisons; Lidl; Sainsbury's; Tesco; Waitrose; Small local retailer; Other – please specify) 
7) Think about the last time you used carrier bags in your grocery shopping trip (these can be 
your own bags, as well as new ones from the store). How many bags did you use? (if above 
15, please indicate 15) 
8) Of the bags you used, how many new carrier bags did you get from the store? (if above 15, 
please indicate 15) 
9) Do you think it is right for the government to make retailers charge customers for plastic 
carrier bags? (Yes; No) 
10) What do you think a fair charge for plastic carrier bag should be (in pence)? 
Attitudes 
On a 100-point scale (0 = “I strongly disagree”; 100 = “I strongly agree”), what is your level of 
agreement with the following statement? (randomized order) 
11) Minimizing the number of plastic carrier bags when I shop for groceries is important to me, 
regardless of any benefit or inconvenience that may result.  
12) I feel good when I don’t use new plastic carrier bags when I shop for groceries because it 
helps the environment. 
13) Charging for carrier bags and giving the profits to a good cause (e.g. donating to a charity) 
will ensure that plastic carrier bag use is no longer a problem for our society. 
14) The government should not interfere by requiring retailers to charge for plastic carrier bags. 
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15) Plastic carrier bags are currently overused. 
16) Other customers will continue using plastic carrier bags even if I stop using them. 
17) Shoppers have a moral obligation to minimize the use of plastic carrier bags. 
Complementary/Substitute behaviours 
18) Thinking about the past 7 days, how much money did you donate to a good cause, in 
pounds? (e.g. donating to a charity) 
19) Thinking about today, did you have a reusable carrier bag with you? (Yes; No) 
20) Thinking about your last grocery shopping trip, did you buy any long-life/reusable bags? 
(Yes; No) 
21) Finally, thinking about your last grocery shopping trip again, did you buy plastic bin liners? 
(Yes; No) 
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Appendix B : Robustness Tests 
The differences-in-differences results presented in the paper estimated the impact of the legislative 
change on a group of consumers not exposed to the government imposed charge relative to a 
reference group who were already paying the charge due to government policy. The choice of 
reference group might influence the results observed in the case of this analysis: in a differences-in-
differences analysis, the impact of the legislative change on a target population is estimated relative to 
a control population of individuals usually unexposed to the policy. In particular, there may be a 
fundamental problem of self-selection whereby the treatment allocation is not truly random (given 
that treatment has previously occurred elsewhere and movement may have occurred as a result). 
(Keele et al., 2015). This problem is unlikely to occur in regard to jurisdictions such as Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, or Wales, given their many similarities and common environmental policies; 
nevertheless, it is important to check the robustness of the results, given varying definitions of the 
control group concerned.  
In this section we run a series of robustness checks to test the validity of the results that have 
been presented. The robustness checks entail repeating the analyses above for four different samples, 
changing the control groups. The first alternative (including Marks & Spencer (M&S) in the Control 
group) places M&S customers in the control group in England, to account for the fact that these 
consumers were already being charged for bags on environmental grounds.46 However, this approach 
assumes that the presence of the voluntary M&S charge is equivalent to legislation. A second option 
(Only England) is to observe change in England only, where the new policy was introduced; in this 
case, the control group refers only to shoppers in M&S, who were already being charged for plastic 
bags with an environmental rationale. The same caveat of the first alternative applies to this set of 
results. The third option is to remove individuals shopping in M&S from the analysis altogether, 
comparing inter-country differences as a purely natural experiment; this approach would remove the 
potential self-selection of environmentally motivated shoppers who may prefer M&S because of their 
                                                            
46 Prior to the charge being implemented in the UK, one retailer (M&S) charged consumers for new plastic bags 
explicitly on environmental grounds.  This was in response to a government campaign to institute voluntary 
restrictions on the consumption of new plastic bags.  (see fn. 17 and associated text) 
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interest in the reduction of plastic bags waste that may contaminate option 1. The fourth option is to 
only include individuals shopping in M&S (i.e. those who have shopped at least once in the four 
weeks before the charge was introduced), comparing inter-country differences as a purely natural 
experiment. Here both groups were paying for plastic bags, and the only difference was the legislative 
framework for the charge.  
Table A1 presents the DiD estimates using the different control groups. Note that the “New 
bags” regression refers to the regression without adding motivation (as in the third column of table 2), 
to provide an estimate of the total effect (direct plus indirect) of the charge. Results indicate that the 
addition of M&S customers in the control group appears to dilute the impact of the charge on both 
new plastic bags used, and the impact on intrinsic motivation. Reductions are often greater than 50%. 
Similarly, using M&S customers as the control in an all-English sample causes a further reduction in 
the size of the effects, primarily due to the fact that the two samples effectively did not show a 
different impact on intrinsic motivations – an indication that within the country, consumers had the 
very similar views of the problem of plastic bags overconsumption before and after the introduction of 
the change. The removal of M&S customers altogether sees an increase in the estimates of the drop in 
new plastic bags used, and on the impact on motivations after 6 weeks; however, this sample shows 
the significant jump in motivation to be temporary. The estimated impact of plastic bags remains of a 
comparable magnitude when analyzing M&S customers only; however, this sample shows an 
opposite trend on motivations: English customers show a big jump in motivation one week after the 
policy is introduced, which then dissolves six weeks later. These results support our main 
results/conclusions; the treatment group sees a significant fall in new plastic bags consumed and an 
increase in internalized motivation (however in some specifications this increase in motivation is less 
persistent).   
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Table A1: Robustness checks for the difference-in-difference estimator, marginal effects 
 
 
Policy  
Period 
 Main results 1. M&S in 
Control group 
2. Only England 3. No M&S 4. M&S only 
New bags 2 Coefficient -0.8482** -0.2154** -0.0844** -0.6246** -1.0520** 
  S.E. 0.0496 0.0141 0.0291 0.0434 0.1010 
 3 Coefficient -0.9907** -0.5584** -0.3203** -0.7729** -1.3095** 
  S.E. 0.0156 0.009210 0.0107 0.0382 0.0106 
Intrinsic motivation 2 Coefficient 3.6744** 1.9566+ 0.7245 0.5952 7.6139* 
  S.E. 0.2292 0.4671 0.5807 0.3671 0.8595 
 3 Coefficient 3.4110** 1.4538* 0.1241 3.7048* -0.3559 
  S.E. 0.2141 0.2975 0.2897 0.5886 1.1366 
Observations   2,704 2,704 2,265 1,827 877 
Significance is as follows: + = 0.10; * = 0.05; ** = 0.01. Note: for the “New bags” equation, results refer to the regression without attitudinal variables. For details on 
estimation, refer to table 2. For Tobit equations (New bags), the coefficient refers to the marginal effect of the DID estimator, and the standard error is calculated with the 
Delta method. For OLS (Intrinsic motivations), the DID estimator is the coefficient of the regression.   
 
 
